A Brief Overview of the Persian Gulf War
In early August, 1990, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein led a militaristic invasion and occupation of the neighboring nation of Kuwait, as a result of an outbreak of conflicts over war debts following the Cold War. This invasion was met with widespread international condemnation, which manifested in a multitude of anti-Iraqi initiatives, particularly in economic sanctions and resolutions enacted by the United Nations' Security Council. The U.S. intervened in this conflict when President George H.W. Bush sent out U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia. Consequently, a mass-scale naval and aerial bombardment of the region, known as "Operation Desert Storm", ensued. Following the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, the U.S began to withdraw troops after staging an attempted coup against Saddam Hussein's military regime. This war initiated the multitude of conflicts that the U.S would experience with nations in the Middle East, and would eventually culminate into other wars such as the Iraq War, Afghanistan War, and wars on terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, especially following an outbreak of conflicts such as the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001.
The map above summarizes many of the key areas involved in the Gulf War, including naval forces, air bases, oil refineries/fields, and front lines.
Calm Before the Storm: A look into the causes of the First Persian Gulf War
By Elijah Stimson
On the dawn of the 1990’s, America was jubilant. Finally, after four decades of intense rivalries, nuclear arms races, and grim antipathy, the Soviet Union, the greatest enemy of the free world, was falling. A strange uncertainty soon became prevalent in the minds of Americans. Now what? Many of them asked. So much of America’s face in the previous world had been an emphatic stand against communism. And now that had caved in. In the midst of this confusion came shocking news from the Middle East. Iraq, one of the oil exporting countries on the Arabian Peninsula, had invaded its small neighbor, Kuwait, much to everyone’s surprise even that of the invaded. Eventually, this would lead to a United States led coalition of nations leading a campaign both to defend Saudi Arabia from the Iraqi troops, and a joint strike to liberate Kuwait famously known as Operation Desert Storm. This conflict would have strong
effects on the Middle East and, eventually, America, which would eventually become embroiled in a second war in Iraq. However, while the effects are numerous and well studied, less spoken of are the causes of the so called Gulf War. To determine these, it is necessary to look into Iraqi history, Baathism, the ideology of the President of Iraq Saddam Hussein, and U.S. foreign policy in the area.
When Saddam Hussein came into power, Iraq had already had experienced dictators. In the late fifties, the first of three consecutive dictators, Abdul Karim Kasem, came to power. Three years later, he would begin to lay the groundwork of what would become the modern Gulf War. In 1961, Britain gave Kuwait, a small nation to the south of Iraq, its independence. Kasem attempted to claim the territory for Iraq, but none of the other Arab nations in the area would
support his claim to the nation, isolating his country in the Middle East. Eighteen years later, Saddam Hussein would come to power. Placing his nation into a grueling eight year war with Iraq’s eastern neighbor Iran, Hussein would eventually severely weaken and damage his own nation. Needing money, Hussein desperately tried to pressure Kuwait into helping him raise oil prices to generate more revenue for his nation. However, this proved to be a failure, and Hussein would later accuse the Kuwaitis of conspiracy. This Iraqi Kuwaiti animosity would translate into the most direct cause of the Gulf War, when the Iraqi Army rolled across the border in August of 1990.
However, when looking at Saddam and his regime, it is important to note the political ideology that both he and his forerunners sprung from: the ideology of Baathism. Originally created in the 1920’s and 30’s by Syrian students who wanted to overthrow colonial rule and establish middle Eastern States, Baathism took the ideas of totalitarian Soviet Communism and German Nationalism, and attempted to apply them to the Middle East. Just as German Nationalism idealized the historic Germanic tribesman as a “superman”, Baathism revered and adored the Arabs of the seventh century. Ironically, both ideologies were antisemitic. These were combined with Soviet ideas to create a nationalsocialist ideology. This would eventually become a predominant political ideology in the Middle East, coming to power in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, Saddam Hussein himself was a Baathist dictator, and the third in a line of such.
But, one might ask, how does Baathism relate to the invasion of Kuwait? This would require a deeper look into the writings of the major Baathist philosopher, Michel Aflaq. According to his excerpts discussing the idea of panArabism (the idea that all Arabs should be united as a single group), he talks about the socalled “Arab Personality” , an idealized Arab national consciousness, and how the World War 1era division of the Middle East by France and Britain had shattered this consciousness. The only way to fix this, he argues indirectly through his piece, is to attempt to reunite, and by doing so restore it. This idea of a reunification has thus been a core tenet of Baathist ideology since its inception. How does this relate to the Gulf War? Although the price of Kuwaiti oil and the shambles much of Iraq was in at the time was the most direct cause for the Gulf war, there may well have been deeper, ideological causes for the invasion. The idea of PanArabism and the “Arab Personality” may not directly translate into invasion of other Arab nations such as Kuwait, but it does certainly suggest it using the rhetoric of reunification. Saddam, being a dictator under the sway of Baathist Ideas, would almost certainly have meditated upon this as he planned his invasion of Kuwait. This also would make sense given his own personal statements about him being the selftitled Saladin of the Arab world. After all, what was the original Saladin but a unifier of the Islamic people against the Crusaders?
Of course, political ideology and the fixing of oil prices were not the only concerns of the Iraqi government as it planned its invasion. Nor were the United States absent from the mind of Saddam Hussein as he did so. Indeed, Saddam had actually made moves to attempt to placate the world’s newlychristened lone superpower. Meanwhile, the United States and much of the Arab world as well was confused about Iraq’s true intentions. In fact, while talking to Saddam, the U.S. ambassador April Glaspie told him that they had no interest in such events as what the United States viewed as a mere border dispute with Kuwait. Saddam interpreted the words into exactly what he wanted to hear: that the United States would not intervene if he were to invade. An unsuccessful push in the United States military to send F15 fighter jets and a naval task force to the region even further strengthened Saddam’s belief that the U.S. would do nothing. However, he was actually making a mistake. Washington had not consented to the invasion; it was still viewing the oncoming conflict as a mere border dispute, not a full-blown invasion. Thus, when he ordered the invasion of Kuwait, both the United States and Saddam were surprised. On the part of the United States, this was simply a misjudgement of intentions, which shocked the officials in Washington but otherwise did no real harm. Hussein’s mistake, on the other hand, would prove to be more disastrous. In January of 1991, United States President George Herbert Walker Bush would deliver a speech to the American people on how, to contain Iraqi aggression, the United States and other nations should intervene to prevent an invasion of other Arab nations and eventually liberate Kuwait. This would eventually create a massive Allied coalition of nations, one that Saddam Hussein had not planned to fight. It is doubtful, if Saddam had truly understood the extent of American confusion on what his true intentions in Kuwait were, that he would have proceeded in his plan. At the very least, he would have to go through extensive negotiations to ensure his invasion would not be contested, rather than merely invade and assume the U.S would do nothing.
While a relatively innocuous conflict at the time, the first Persian Gulf War would eventually cause more problems than it ended. A young Saudi man who had offered a private panArabian army to help his home country had been rejected in favor of U.S.led help. This man would eventually become the notorious leader of Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden. As well, Saddam Hussein’s remaining in power would remain a thorn in the side of neoconservatives for a decade, including Bush’s son, George W. Bush, who would eventually invade Iraq again in 2003 in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks. All of these events can eventually be traced back to many root causes one of which is the first Persian Gulf War.
Works Cited:
Gladwin, Rahul. “My Experience During the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait” Accessed May 22, 2016.
Berman, Paul. “Baathism: An Obituary.”New Republic. Accessed May 22, 2016.
Bard, Mitchell G. “History of Modern Iraq”Jewish Virtual Library. Accessed May 22, 2016
Saddam Hussein, Interview by George R Piro, Baghdad Operation Center, February 24, 2012.
Bush, George H.W., “Gulf War Speech”,speech, Washington, D.C, January 17, 1991. The
History Place.
Trainor, Bernard. "Gulf War 1." FootNotes. Accessed May 22, 2016.
effects on the Middle East and, eventually, America, which would eventually become embroiled in a second war in Iraq. However, while the effects are numerous and well studied, less spoken of are the causes of the so called Gulf War. To determine these, it is necessary to look into Iraqi history, Baathism, the ideology of the President of Iraq Saddam Hussein, and U.S. foreign policy in the area.
When Saddam Hussein came into power, Iraq had already had experienced dictators. In the late fifties, the first of three consecutive dictators, Abdul Karim Kasem, came to power. Three years later, he would begin to lay the groundwork of what would become the modern Gulf War. In 1961, Britain gave Kuwait, a small nation to the south of Iraq, its independence. Kasem attempted to claim the territory for Iraq, but none of the other Arab nations in the area would
support his claim to the nation, isolating his country in the Middle East. Eighteen years later, Saddam Hussein would come to power. Placing his nation into a grueling eight year war with Iraq’s eastern neighbor Iran, Hussein would eventually severely weaken and damage his own nation. Needing money, Hussein desperately tried to pressure Kuwait into helping him raise oil prices to generate more revenue for his nation. However, this proved to be a failure, and Hussein would later accuse the Kuwaitis of conspiracy. This Iraqi Kuwaiti animosity would translate into the most direct cause of the Gulf War, when the Iraqi Army rolled across the border in August of 1990.
However, when looking at Saddam and his regime, it is important to note the political ideology that both he and his forerunners sprung from: the ideology of Baathism. Originally created in the 1920’s and 30’s by Syrian students who wanted to overthrow colonial rule and establish middle Eastern States, Baathism took the ideas of totalitarian Soviet Communism and German Nationalism, and attempted to apply them to the Middle East. Just as German Nationalism idealized the historic Germanic tribesman as a “superman”, Baathism revered and adored the Arabs of the seventh century. Ironically, both ideologies were antisemitic. These were combined with Soviet ideas to create a nationalsocialist ideology. This would eventually become a predominant political ideology in the Middle East, coming to power in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, Saddam Hussein himself was a Baathist dictator, and the third in a line of such.
But, one might ask, how does Baathism relate to the invasion of Kuwait? This would require a deeper look into the writings of the major Baathist philosopher, Michel Aflaq. According to his excerpts discussing the idea of panArabism (the idea that all Arabs should be united as a single group), he talks about the socalled “Arab Personality” , an idealized Arab national consciousness, and how the World War 1era division of the Middle East by France and Britain had shattered this consciousness. The only way to fix this, he argues indirectly through his piece, is to attempt to reunite, and by doing so restore it. This idea of a reunification has thus been a core tenet of Baathist ideology since its inception. How does this relate to the Gulf War? Although the price of Kuwaiti oil and the shambles much of Iraq was in at the time was the most direct cause for the Gulf war, there may well have been deeper, ideological causes for the invasion. The idea of PanArabism and the “Arab Personality” may not directly translate into invasion of other Arab nations such as Kuwait, but it does certainly suggest it using the rhetoric of reunification. Saddam, being a dictator under the sway of Baathist Ideas, would almost certainly have meditated upon this as he planned his invasion of Kuwait. This also would make sense given his own personal statements about him being the selftitled Saladin of the Arab world. After all, what was the original Saladin but a unifier of the Islamic people against the Crusaders?
Of course, political ideology and the fixing of oil prices were not the only concerns of the Iraqi government as it planned its invasion. Nor were the United States absent from the mind of Saddam Hussein as he did so. Indeed, Saddam had actually made moves to attempt to placate the world’s newlychristened lone superpower. Meanwhile, the United States and much of the Arab world as well was confused about Iraq’s true intentions. In fact, while talking to Saddam, the U.S. ambassador April Glaspie told him that they had no interest in such events as what the United States viewed as a mere border dispute with Kuwait. Saddam interpreted the words into exactly what he wanted to hear: that the United States would not intervene if he were to invade. An unsuccessful push in the United States military to send F15 fighter jets and a naval task force to the region even further strengthened Saddam’s belief that the U.S. would do nothing. However, he was actually making a mistake. Washington had not consented to the invasion; it was still viewing the oncoming conflict as a mere border dispute, not a full-blown invasion. Thus, when he ordered the invasion of Kuwait, both the United States and Saddam were surprised. On the part of the United States, this was simply a misjudgement of intentions, which shocked the officials in Washington but otherwise did no real harm. Hussein’s mistake, on the other hand, would prove to be more disastrous. In January of 1991, United States President George Herbert Walker Bush would deliver a speech to the American people on how, to contain Iraqi aggression, the United States and other nations should intervene to prevent an invasion of other Arab nations and eventually liberate Kuwait. This would eventually create a massive Allied coalition of nations, one that Saddam Hussein had not planned to fight. It is doubtful, if Saddam had truly understood the extent of American confusion on what his true intentions in Kuwait were, that he would have proceeded in his plan. At the very least, he would have to go through extensive negotiations to ensure his invasion would not be contested, rather than merely invade and assume the U.S would do nothing.
While a relatively innocuous conflict at the time, the first Persian Gulf War would eventually cause more problems than it ended. A young Saudi man who had offered a private panArabian army to help his home country had been rejected in favor of U.S.led help. This man would eventually become the notorious leader of Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden. As well, Saddam Hussein’s remaining in power would remain a thorn in the side of neoconservatives for a decade, including Bush’s son, George W. Bush, who would eventually invade Iraq again in 2003 in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks. All of these events can eventually be traced back to many root causes one of which is the first Persian Gulf War.
Works Cited:
Gladwin, Rahul. “My Experience During the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait” Accessed May 22, 2016.
Berman, Paul. “Baathism: An Obituary.”New Republic. Accessed May 22, 2016.
Bard, Mitchell G. “History of Modern Iraq”Jewish Virtual Library. Accessed May 22, 2016
Saddam Hussein, Interview by George R Piro, Baghdad Operation Center, February 24, 2012.
Bush, George H.W., “Gulf War Speech”,speech, Washington, D.C, January 17, 1991. The
History Place.
Trainor, Bernard. "Gulf War 1." FootNotes. Accessed May 22, 2016.
The United Nations' Economic Sanctions on Iraq and the Subsequent Strife of Its People Following the Persian Gulf War
By Jakob Morris
In early August, 1990, Iraqi president Saddam Hussein ordered the armed invasion and occupation of the neighboring nation of Kuwait. This incident followed Iraqi refusal to take active steps in mitigating its economic debt to Kuwait as well as Saudi Arabia, instead pressuring them to forgive the debt. In an attempt to protect the invaded nation, the United Nations intervened in the affair, and subsequent tensions eventually caused the Persian Gulf War to begin that month. Dependent upon the military assistance of the United States, Great Britain, France, and other nations, the UN implemented the popular military endeavor Operation Desert Storm in order to force the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Furthermore, the UN’s National Security Council’s war stratagem comprised of economic sanctions during and following the conflict, in order to ensure that Hussein would not repeat this type of aggression, as well as enforcing compliance to post-war UN resolutions. Hussein often refused to comply, and the sanctions consequently increased in intensity, and tensions between Iraq and the United Nations increased.
Saddam Hussein’s refusal to comply with post-war UN initiatives sustained even until his death in 2003. The United States became intensely engaged in a war on terrorism following this occurrence as well as others, namely the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, which prompted immense military conflicts with Middle Eastern nations, including Iraq. The United Nations, as a result, sustained its economic sanctions on the nation, justifying their actions by pointing out the myriad of human rights abuses towards the people of Iraq. However, when the actual consequences of these sanctions in terms of the deterioration of Iraqi society are considered, the sanctions are evident to have done more harm than good. Despite the fact that Hussein’s presidency and invasion of Kuwait during the Gulf War was construed as a serious threat to world peace, and that these sanctions were seen as a necessary initiative to prevent future aggression, a strong contention can be made that the sufferings of Iraqi citizens following the implementation of these sanctions is hardly justifiable.
The issues regarding the negative consequences of the United Nation's sanctions on Iraq during and following the Persian Gulf War are immensely multifaceted and nuanced, so an important factor to consider is the original desired consequences of the sanctions and, moreover, how the UN hoped they would impact Iraq. One of the first UN resolutions to be implemented following the war was Resolution 687, passed by the Security Council in early 1991. The resolution pressured Iraq to summarily repay its war debts, as well as openly destroy its vast arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, it imposed strict economic restrictions on the nation, restricting its importation of basic supplies such as food and building materials, and also blocked the exportation of goods with the exception of a limited amount of oil until the demands of the resolution were met. The UN took strict initiatives to monitor Iraqi activity following this resolution, organizing small cabals to monitor and control Iraq's national spending and mass weaponry.
Many justify these sanctions with the contention that they have contained the aggression of Hussein’s regime, having thwarted any further endeavors with weapons of mass destruction and their subsequent distribution in other militaristic undertakings he may have pursued. Also, the sanctions did allow the importation of medicine and foodstuffs into the nation, supporting the assertion that the resolutions were not entirely malicious. Furthermore, many contend that terrorist acts of aggression – such as the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, in which it was widely argued that Iraq was directly involved in the attacks – justifiably prompted the sanctions in that it prevented Hussein’s totalitarian nation from becoming involved with more conflicts.
While these benign characteristics of the UN Security Council’s sanctions are indeed factors to be considered in assessing their overall success and positive results, the sanctions possessed a myriad of foibles that attenuated their ultimate success. Saddam Hussein, exerting total peremptory force upon the citizens of Iraq ever since his ascension to the presidency in 1979, was often extremely disobliging to the UN, particularly regarding the Security Council’s monitoring of Iraq’s weapons manufacturers and testing sites. Even with the plethora of UN-imposed economic restrictions enforced upon him and his administration, he still found methods to acquire funds and weapons by means of smuggling, and also succeeded at using the sanctions to serve as a detriment to Iraqi society and provoke international attention and subsequent opposition. He often would act with his own power in mind, pushing his own agenda and as a result leaving destitute Iraqi citizens to suffer.
Along with the enabling of a totalitarian dictator to push his own weapon-smuggling agenda relentlessly, another rather less-than-serendipitous result of the UN’s economic sanctions was the sharp decline in societal prosperity as well as general living conditions in Iraq during the mid-1990s and beyond. Directly following these sanctions, a combination of immense war debts, lack of economic comfort, and a shortage of infrastructural materials, the basic infrastructure of Iraqi cities and towns suffered and deteriorated immensely. Due to lack of funds for water purification and maintenance, sewage lines and pipes in major cities like Baghdad were often punctured, and they consequently poured out raw sewage into major rivers and soon thereafter Iraq’s major water supply, reducing the amount of drinkable water in some areas to less than 50 percent. This infrastructural destruction was a direct result of the UN’s economic sanctions, as it prohibited the importation of materials that could assuage the water crisis. Similar deteriorations took place in the agricultural sector as well as the power grid, because the economic sanctions prohibited the importation of materials that could have improved these situations as well. Essentially, the economic sanctions prevented post-war recovery in Iraq despite its original intention to inspire reform in the nation, and this incapability of rebuilding caused the most basic infrastructural services of Iraq to be abrogated and rendered useless.
The most significant resource that was blockaded from importation under the UN’s economic sanctions against Iraq following the war was food. Prior to the implementation of these sanctions, Iraq imported nearly two thirds of its food supply, and spent an average of $2.5 billion on these imports prior to the Persian Gulf War. Limited in ability to produce ample food itself due to its arid and desert climate, the implementation of the sanctions following the conflict caused Iraq to be essentially incapable of producing enough food to supply its populace with sustenance, and as a result Iraqi citizens have lived with continuous and unremitting food shortages ever since the war ended.
This severe lack of basic services amongst Iraqi society following the implementation of these economic sanctions has caused an immense amount of civilian casualties due to sickness, malnourishment, and injury. Hussein’ totalitarianism restricted basic healthcare to the extremely affluent even prior to the sanctions being enacted, and the sanctions made it even harder for them in that it completely restricted the importation of medicine or other medical tools. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), founded to protect the interests of children in third world countries, discovered that the mid and late 1990s were rife with malnourished children, the exact number reaching to upwards of one third of all children living in Iraq. The resulting death and emaciation of Iraqi citizens has left the state of the society in complete shambles, with premature death becoming almost inexorable amongst the populace. Furthermore, most Iraqis were completely cut off from basic health coverage or health care; decrepit hospitals and other medical facilities were often so unclean, contaminated, and short of power that thousands of Iraqis would be left without any treatment for their illnesses. Medical equipment and other tools –including even diagnostic tools, vaccines, and ambulances - were prohibited from being imported under the economic sanctions. Consequently, completely preventable physical afflictions broke out throughout the nation, with diseases like cholera or typhoid developing in rural and impoverished areas, and citizens were left without any opportunity to pursue treatment. As a result of these economic sanctions, which prohibited the importation of medicinal tools almost entirely, Iraq was left without quality healthcare or any reliable medical treatment. This issue was addressed in several reformative Security Council Resolutions, including Resolutions 986 and 706, which dealt with identifying the need for humanitarian relief in the nation as a result of an undeniable surge in nutritional and health issues, but it was nonetheless the original sanctions that allowed such a crisis to occur.
Many contend that the variety of economic sanctions imposed upon Iraq as a result of the Persian Gulf War were effective in regards to their ability to suppress further aggressive action on the part of Saddam Hussein up until his death in 2006, and justified in that the human rights abuses in Iraq towards Iraqi civilians prompted such a diplomatic action. But each of the described consequences of the sanctions has had a significantly destructive effect on Iraqi society, ranging in sectors from food to infrastructure to even healthcare. The principle of civilian protection has greatly influenced the opposition to such sanctions, as they believe that innocent civilians need not suffer as a result of punishing the Iraqi government itself. The ostensibly intentional crippling of Iraq’s economy, coupled with Hussein’s repeated refusal to comply with the UN’s plethora of resolutions, left Iraq in a state of complete penury in which they had no ability to recover following the Persian Gulf War. The sanctions did indeed put Hussein in a position in which he could no longer pursue aggressive military endeavors, granted, but the subsequent sufferings of the general Iraqi populace begs the question of whether or not they were truly beneficial or even justified at all.
The collection of economic sanctions on Iraq implemented by the United Nations were instigated directly by the acts of aggression that Iraq proved fully capable of performing with its invasion of Kuwait immediately prior to the Persian Gulf War, and were meant entirely to prevent further aggression from Iraq. What the sanctions ignored, however, was how Iraq would rebuild following the war, and how destitute post-war conditions may have proved detrimental to Iraqi society as a whole. So while impactful in regards to its peacekeeping elements, the lack of consideration for post-war reconstruction and the consequent issues that arose in Iraq as well as with the United Nations indeed lends substantial credibility to opposition to these sanctions that caused great imbalance in a nation’s society and economy for over two decades.
Bibliography
“Iraq Surveys Show 'Humanitarian Emergency'.” UNICEF Newsline. 12 Aug. 1999. Accessed 1
June 2016. http://www.unicef.org/newsline/99pr29.htm
Feith, Douglas J. War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on
Terrorism. New York: HarperCollins. 2008.
Köchler, Hans "ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT - Studies in
International Relations, XXIII.” Vienna: International Progress Organization. 1997.
Sen, B. "Evaluation Report: 2003 IRQ: Iraq Watching Reports - Overview Report, July 2003."
UNICEF. Accessed June 1, 2016. http://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/index_29697.html
“Iraq-Related Sanctions.” U.S. Department of the Treasury. 17 Sept. 2015. Accessed 1 June
2016. https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/iraq.aspx
“Resolution 687.” United Nations Security Council. 3 Apr. 1991. 1 June 2016
http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/resolution687.htm
Saddam Hussein’s refusal to comply with post-war UN initiatives sustained even until his death in 2003. The United States became intensely engaged in a war on terrorism following this occurrence as well as others, namely the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, which prompted immense military conflicts with Middle Eastern nations, including Iraq. The United Nations, as a result, sustained its economic sanctions on the nation, justifying their actions by pointing out the myriad of human rights abuses towards the people of Iraq. However, when the actual consequences of these sanctions in terms of the deterioration of Iraqi society are considered, the sanctions are evident to have done more harm than good. Despite the fact that Hussein’s presidency and invasion of Kuwait during the Gulf War was construed as a serious threat to world peace, and that these sanctions were seen as a necessary initiative to prevent future aggression, a strong contention can be made that the sufferings of Iraqi citizens following the implementation of these sanctions is hardly justifiable.
The issues regarding the negative consequences of the United Nation's sanctions on Iraq during and following the Persian Gulf War are immensely multifaceted and nuanced, so an important factor to consider is the original desired consequences of the sanctions and, moreover, how the UN hoped they would impact Iraq. One of the first UN resolutions to be implemented following the war was Resolution 687, passed by the Security Council in early 1991. The resolution pressured Iraq to summarily repay its war debts, as well as openly destroy its vast arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, it imposed strict economic restrictions on the nation, restricting its importation of basic supplies such as food and building materials, and also blocked the exportation of goods with the exception of a limited amount of oil until the demands of the resolution were met. The UN took strict initiatives to monitor Iraqi activity following this resolution, organizing small cabals to monitor and control Iraq's national spending and mass weaponry.
Many justify these sanctions with the contention that they have contained the aggression of Hussein’s regime, having thwarted any further endeavors with weapons of mass destruction and their subsequent distribution in other militaristic undertakings he may have pursued. Also, the sanctions did allow the importation of medicine and foodstuffs into the nation, supporting the assertion that the resolutions were not entirely malicious. Furthermore, many contend that terrorist acts of aggression – such as the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, in which it was widely argued that Iraq was directly involved in the attacks – justifiably prompted the sanctions in that it prevented Hussein’s totalitarian nation from becoming involved with more conflicts.
While these benign characteristics of the UN Security Council’s sanctions are indeed factors to be considered in assessing their overall success and positive results, the sanctions possessed a myriad of foibles that attenuated their ultimate success. Saddam Hussein, exerting total peremptory force upon the citizens of Iraq ever since his ascension to the presidency in 1979, was often extremely disobliging to the UN, particularly regarding the Security Council’s monitoring of Iraq’s weapons manufacturers and testing sites. Even with the plethora of UN-imposed economic restrictions enforced upon him and his administration, he still found methods to acquire funds and weapons by means of smuggling, and also succeeded at using the sanctions to serve as a detriment to Iraqi society and provoke international attention and subsequent opposition. He often would act with his own power in mind, pushing his own agenda and as a result leaving destitute Iraqi citizens to suffer.
Along with the enabling of a totalitarian dictator to push his own weapon-smuggling agenda relentlessly, another rather less-than-serendipitous result of the UN’s economic sanctions was the sharp decline in societal prosperity as well as general living conditions in Iraq during the mid-1990s and beyond. Directly following these sanctions, a combination of immense war debts, lack of economic comfort, and a shortage of infrastructural materials, the basic infrastructure of Iraqi cities and towns suffered and deteriorated immensely. Due to lack of funds for water purification and maintenance, sewage lines and pipes in major cities like Baghdad were often punctured, and they consequently poured out raw sewage into major rivers and soon thereafter Iraq’s major water supply, reducing the amount of drinkable water in some areas to less than 50 percent. This infrastructural destruction was a direct result of the UN’s economic sanctions, as it prohibited the importation of materials that could assuage the water crisis. Similar deteriorations took place in the agricultural sector as well as the power grid, because the economic sanctions prohibited the importation of materials that could have improved these situations as well. Essentially, the economic sanctions prevented post-war recovery in Iraq despite its original intention to inspire reform in the nation, and this incapability of rebuilding caused the most basic infrastructural services of Iraq to be abrogated and rendered useless.
The most significant resource that was blockaded from importation under the UN’s economic sanctions against Iraq following the war was food. Prior to the implementation of these sanctions, Iraq imported nearly two thirds of its food supply, and spent an average of $2.5 billion on these imports prior to the Persian Gulf War. Limited in ability to produce ample food itself due to its arid and desert climate, the implementation of the sanctions following the conflict caused Iraq to be essentially incapable of producing enough food to supply its populace with sustenance, and as a result Iraqi citizens have lived with continuous and unremitting food shortages ever since the war ended.
This severe lack of basic services amongst Iraqi society following the implementation of these economic sanctions has caused an immense amount of civilian casualties due to sickness, malnourishment, and injury. Hussein’ totalitarianism restricted basic healthcare to the extremely affluent even prior to the sanctions being enacted, and the sanctions made it even harder for them in that it completely restricted the importation of medicine or other medical tools. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), founded to protect the interests of children in third world countries, discovered that the mid and late 1990s were rife with malnourished children, the exact number reaching to upwards of one third of all children living in Iraq. The resulting death and emaciation of Iraqi citizens has left the state of the society in complete shambles, with premature death becoming almost inexorable amongst the populace. Furthermore, most Iraqis were completely cut off from basic health coverage or health care; decrepit hospitals and other medical facilities were often so unclean, contaminated, and short of power that thousands of Iraqis would be left without any treatment for their illnesses. Medical equipment and other tools –including even diagnostic tools, vaccines, and ambulances - were prohibited from being imported under the economic sanctions. Consequently, completely preventable physical afflictions broke out throughout the nation, with diseases like cholera or typhoid developing in rural and impoverished areas, and citizens were left without any opportunity to pursue treatment. As a result of these economic sanctions, which prohibited the importation of medicinal tools almost entirely, Iraq was left without quality healthcare or any reliable medical treatment. This issue was addressed in several reformative Security Council Resolutions, including Resolutions 986 and 706, which dealt with identifying the need for humanitarian relief in the nation as a result of an undeniable surge in nutritional and health issues, but it was nonetheless the original sanctions that allowed such a crisis to occur.
Many contend that the variety of economic sanctions imposed upon Iraq as a result of the Persian Gulf War were effective in regards to their ability to suppress further aggressive action on the part of Saddam Hussein up until his death in 2006, and justified in that the human rights abuses in Iraq towards Iraqi civilians prompted such a diplomatic action. But each of the described consequences of the sanctions has had a significantly destructive effect on Iraqi society, ranging in sectors from food to infrastructure to even healthcare. The principle of civilian protection has greatly influenced the opposition to such sanctions, as they believe that innocent civilians need not suffer as a result of punishing the Iraqi government itself. The ostensibly intentional crippling of Iraq’s economy, coupled with Hussein’s repeated refusal to comply with the UN’s plethora of resolutions, left Iraq in a state of complete penury in which they had no ability to recover following the Persian Gulf War. The sanctions did indeed put Hussein in a position in which he could no longer pursue aggressive military endeavors, granted, but the subsequent sufferings of the general Iraqi populace begs the question of whether or not they were truly beneficial or even justified at all.
The collection of economic sanctions on Iraq implemented by the United Nations were instigated directly by the acts of aggression that Iraq proved fully capable of performing with its invasion of Kuwait immediately prior to the Persian Gulf War, and were meant entirely to prevent further aggression from Iraq. What the sanctions ignored, however, was how Iraq would rebuild following the war, and how destitute post-war conditions may have proved detrimental to Iraqi society as a whole. So while impactful in regards to its peacekeeping elements, the lack of consideration for post-war reconstruction and the consequent issues that arose in Iraq as well as with the United Nations indeed lends substantial credibility to opposition to these sanctions that caused great imbalance in a nation’s society and economy for over two decades.
Bibliography
“Iraq Surveys Show 'Humanitarian Emergency'.” UNICEF Newsline. 12 Aug. 1999. Accessed 1
June 2016. http://www.unicef.org/newsline/99pr29.htm
Feith, Douglas J. War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on
Terrorism. New York: HarperCollins. 2008.
Köchler, Hans "ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT - Studies in
International Relations, XXIII.” Vienna: International Progress Organization. 1997.
Sen, B. "Evaluation Report: 2003 IRQ: Iraq Watching Reports - Overview Report, July 2003."
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